B&b Aviation&b Aviation
But the legislator has yet to come up with emergency law to finance part of the administration, such as the Department of Homeland Security. Mini-bus laws constitute a clear break from recent years in which Congress regularly ignored agency-specific expenditure policies in favour of so-called "omnibus" parcels that finance the whole administration at once.
Continuing to work cross-party, we can successfully finance nearly 90 per cent of the German administration on schedule through periodic appointments - something Congress has not been able to do for many years," said Richard Shelby, chairman of the Senate's administrative committee, R-Ala. "This deal is not flawless, but it's the kind of compromise," added Senator Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.
He has also warned that he will turn off the administration on October 1 unless Congress provides millions of US dollar to finance his pledged walls along the US and Mexican borders. Using Republicans who run the White House and both Houses of Congress, GOP leaders have attended that electors would rebuke them for a cutoff and worsen the party's chances for maintaining Congress control.
US tax payers spend $1.8 billion to get Afghanistan to air a few tens of A-29 attack planes.
Alone the estimate yearly maintenance cost is more than double that of the U.S. Air Force, which is paid to run a season of F-16s for one year. Recently, the US Army contracted the Sierra Nevada Corporation, or SNC for short, a business valued at over $1.8 billion to assist and expand the Afghan Air Force's A-29 Super Tucano lightweight fighter jet fighter fire over the next five years.
We now know much more about the precise cost of assisting Afghanistan's aircraft, the number of which will rise to at least 25 in the years to come. The U.S. Air Force published on September 11, 2018, an offical statement of reasons for expenditures on the U.S. government's key contract page, FBizOpps.
Pentagon had previously heralded the treaty, an amendment to an earlier treaty allocation, in its initial published notice of 4 September 2018. It will come from the Afghan Security Forces Fund within the Pentagon's own federal envelope. 339 million US dollars for interim contractor support or ICS on the Afghan Air Force's two main operational base for the A-29 - Moody Air Force Base in Georgia and its part of Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan - and up to two forward operational sites simultaneously.
That means that the contractor must be on site at all four sites and be in charge of all work in one of these classes that cannot be carried out by Afghan Air Force staff themselves. 453 million dollars for Contractor Logistics Support or CLS, which will cover the Afghan Air Force A-29's whole Afghan Air Force deployment, which will ultimately increase to at least 25 planes and three floor learning units.
Therefore, full parts pipe line as well as service supervision in Kabul and the two reported forward operational bases are required. It is separated from $40 million for the purpose of developing a Systems Engineering Managment Plan (SEMP) to assist in the "maintenance, revision, power and procurement" of the Afghan Air Force's A-29 aircraft fleets.
22 million for "Over & Above" (O&A) work, which described contingencies such as the need to remedy combat damages or supporting congestion in operations. 823 million dollars for a wide range of items, which includes, but is not restricted to, up to 10 more A-29s - which would contribute to bringing the Afghan Air Force squadron to the target of at least 25 airplanes, but could expand the squadron to nearly 30 airplanes - as well as surface education tools, additional gear and modification of current airplanes.
Some of this will probably be used for the six Super Tucanos bought by the Air Force in November 2017 on Afghanistan's name. These funds will also be used to relocate the Afghan Air Force Air Force Base Air Force Education Mission A-29 from Moody Air Force Base to Afghanistan itself, slightly later than December 2020, and to relocate major and upstream locations within Afghanistan to take in these extra planes and people.
Super Tucanos are at the heart of the US-backed Afghanistan Aviation Transition Plan, which seeks to develop the Afghanistan air forces into a skilled unit able to carry out alone missions against domestic hazards. According to the Pentagon, the aircraft carried one third of all Afghanistan's aerial attacks between 1 April 2018 and 30 June 2018.
Unfortunately, as we have repeatedly demonstrated in the war zone, the NATO-led alliance has and is fighting to help Afghanistan achieve this objective through a variety of determinants, among them bribery, dysertion and low levels of illiteracy - what U.S. officials have called " the Afghanistan situation".
" It was not until March 2018 that the A-29s of Afghanistan dropped their first laser-controlled battle missions, almost four years after the start of the programme and almost two years after the plane boarded. The fact that the airplane gave the Afghans a precision-guided ammunition capacity was also an important point of discussion for the US army, even though the airplanes were actually unable to do so until 2017.
"In its own statement, the Luftwaffe said that the AAF's dwindling capacity to directly aid and sustain the Afghan National Security Forces ( "ANSF") in air-to-ground fire incidents restricts the ANSF's capacity to carry out missions that offer Afghan citizens safety and enhance the legitimate role of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ("GIRoA").
How the Luftwaffe came to these estimates of total aircraft acquisition expenses, which for the entire 25 A-29 aircraft will be significantly higher than expected, is not entirely clear. RAND Corporation in 2013 assessed the operation and maintenance of US Air Force F-16 Viper Jet aircraft, which are significantly more costly to maintain and run than the A-29.
With the help of the fiscal year 2010 dollar, the think Tank estimate that it took the Air Force about 63.6 million dollar - nearer 70 million dollar in 2018 - to hold the Alabama Air National Guard's 187th Wingight, which has about 22 blocks of 30 F-16C/D VIP planes that run for 12 month.
According to data from R&R, the total operational expenses of a U.S. Air Force F-16 in 2013, net of inflation, were less than half of what the Afghan Air Force could spend on the operation of a corresponding number of aircraft of the A-29 series for one year. Alone the one-year ICS expenses are similar to the expenses incurred by the hundredth Hunting Staff in carrying out the survey by the think tanks.
It is difficult to see how this could be an exact costing. A part of this may be related to the need to provide assistance for four sites in two different Member States, but it would still be expected that the end cost of these operations would be lower compared to the F-16, given the much lower basic logistics and the lower total cost of ownership of the A-29.
Luftwaffe says the costs per flying lesson for a VIP are about $22,000. The SNC says the Super Tucano's running costs are nearer $1,000 per flying hour. What's more, the Super Tucano's costs are around $1,000 per mph. Difficulties arise in assessing whether the other types of costs described by the Air Force in the Treaty appear too costly, as they cover a much wider range of articles and sevices and there is no line by line break-down.
Irrespective of this, it should be noted that the treaty will serve only to assist the Afghan Super Tucanos and does not contain any funds that the United States will be spending over the same timeframe to assist many other Afghan Air Force planes. Currently, Afghans are only able to assist one model, the Mi-17 with minimal supplier assistance.
Under a US-backed transitional scheme, the renovated UH-60A+ Black Hawks, which currently demand almost 100 per cent of contractors' service and logistic needs, will be replacing these chokers in the years ahead. When it comes to the servicing and logistic of its six C-130H freighters, the Afghan Air Force also depends entirely on privately owned enterprises.
All of this comes as a reviving Taliban challenges the country's administration and in August 2018 even temporarily takes over Ghazni, the provincial capitol of the same name. In his last briefing on 22 August 2108, as leader of all US and NATO-led Coalition troops in Afghanistan, former U.S. Army General John Nicholson went so far as to praise the Afghan Air Force's advances in gaining operative autonomy as an indication of wider success in the nation against the uprising.
However, if the A-29 case of the Afghan Air Forces is a clue, it will still be an expensive US troop that will depend on US assistance for at least the next five years. It is one of the basic tenets of this treaty that a Nuclear Army that considers itself imprisoned and entangled in a restricted situation consciousness will make poor decisions: that the information asymmetry between the US and Russia, although in favour of the US, can sometimes actually be directed against the interests of the US, and that the US domestic intelligence system will benefit from the fact that Russia is somewhat better informed about what is happening.
The US advantages of Atlanticism are intricate; they presume that US insecurity will benefit from Europe's insecurity and resilience, and they presume that America's assumption of a leading position in Europe's defence will give it overpowering leverage over our policies and attitudes.