Quick Air Jet Charter

Affiliate of Quick Air Service GmbH & Co.

International Private Medical Insurance (iPMI) Quick Air Jet Charter Journal

The Quick Air Jet Charter GmbH was founded in 1992 at Cologne Bonn International Airport. Three turboprop planes with a special emphasis on air ambulances took the air to the city. Over the years, the business has grown continuously and expanded its portfolio to include Learjets with global operations. We have a special air rescue service consisting of three Learjet 55, three Learjet 35, one Learjet 36 and one Citation 550.

The members of our teams come from various fields: pilot, paramedic, army, V.I.P. charter, foreign distribution. Quick-air is part of the Griesemann Aviation Group, which is part of the Griesemann Group, an internationally active specialist in the field of industrial systems. We have over 900 employees in 9 subsidiaries throughout Europe.

Aviation Group comprises Quick Air with a portfolio of eight special aircrafts for air ambulances, CCF Managers Airlines, our own corporate carrier and our subsidiaries Air Service Klausheide located at Munster International and Cologne Bonn Airports in Germany.

The Air Jet Charter

Sorry, no current messages. Use our feedback sheet to keep us up to date with the latest developments. Sorry, no current notifications. Use our feedback sheet to keep us up to date with the latest developments. Please use our feedback sheet to inform us of any mistakes or mistakes on this page.

Limited / Quick Air Jet Charter GmbH

Applicant is an air charterer. Respondent is a supplier of personal jetliners. In July and August 2013, the airlines signed a treaty for two air-ambulance flights. Applicant has not paid in full the debt arising from the July and August flight. Against this background, the respondent sent an e-mail regarding the plaintiff to a mailinglist containing the e-mails of a significant number of airlines.

E-mail entitled "WARNING. Business you should not be involved with," explained that the plaintiff was in "financial difficulty," was a "defaulting debtor," and was able not to repay the arrears to the respondent. To the extent that the communication's normal and normal significance indicated that the undertaking was bankrupt, did it merely alert other undertakings to the applicant's financial difficulty?

Were the e-mail essentially truthful in terms of one of the possible significances at (1)? Has the e-mail been secured by a qualifying authorization? Was the allegation an abusive practice in view of the applicant's behaviour not to reimburse the respondent? Is there a need for significant compensation? From the e-mail, a person would have read that the plaintiff was a debtor who had neglected to repay the amounts due to the respondent and that the cause of this deficiency in payments was that the plaintiff was unable to do so.

Concerning the defendant's claim, the latter could not demonstrate that the plaintiff was bankrupt at the point in view of the claim, so that the defense of the defense was unsuccessful. On the other hand, the respondent demonstrated that the plaintiff was very similar to insolvency. At the same token, the respondent demonstrated the essential veracity about the remainder of the libellous significance transmitted by the e-mail.

There was no shared justified interest on the part of the respondent and the public in communicating the information concerning the applicant's ability to pay. Nor did the respondent have any obligation, either socially or morally, to alert other undertakings to the applicant's ability to pay. This case of the plaintiff's fraud was dismissed because the representative of the respondent who sent the e-mail had reasons to believe that the plaintiff's failure to pay was due to his inability to do so.

Although the defendant's representative was angry with the plaintiff and tried to convince the plaintiff to make the payment, his main motivation was the believe that he was obliged to alert other businesses against the plaintiff. A plaintiff's claim should justify his good name and refute a wrong crediting of bankruptcy.

In spite of the foregoing, as the respondent had managed to prove the partially true nature of the e-mail, Warby J resolved to cut the amount of compensation awarded to the "minimum" amount of £10. Four elements were taken into consideration by the Tribunal when awarding damages: - the appropriate way of reflecting the fact that the plaintiff declared the respondent bankrupt was to take him into consideration in the question of compensation; - the significant degree to which the respondent demonstrated the veracity of the libellous meaning of the words contested; - the "disreputable and eventually disloyal conduct" of the plaintiff in his case in the courts.

The case is also another example of the gap between slander and other causes of complaint with a view to mitigating the general compensation of a disloyal plaintiff. Specifically, in Summers v Fairclough Homes Ltd[2012] 1 WLR 2004, the Tribunal ruled against the reduction of the general compensation of a disloyal plaintiff for bodily harm on the ground that substantial damage had still been sustained and, in the light of that, the plaintiff was eligible for compensation irrespective of the behaviour.

As can be seen here, the Act of Smear has adopted a different stance which allows the infamous behaviour of a plaintiff to lower the general damage levels (see Spiller v Joseph[2012] EWHC 2958 (QB)).